Chairman
"Comrade
President
Among many stories to prove his foresight is the one that he made a clear analysis and evaluation of the essence of the neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan.
The neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan was signed on April 13, 1941.
On his way back from a visit to Germany, Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka dropped in at Moscow and concluded the neutrality pact.
The gist of the treaty was that the signatories should maintain peaceful relations, respect the integrity and inviolability of each other's territory, and observe neutrality when either party engaged in hostilities with a third country.
In the face of the conclusion of the neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan, some people in the revolutionary ranks ideologically vacillated and abandoned the cause of revolution as they thought that everything was hopeless.
To cope with this, on June 20, Juche 30 (1941), the President called the meeting of heads of small units of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army, groups for political work and revolutionary organizations in the Kanbaeksan secret camp and made a speech titled, "We should consummate the Korean revolution by our own efforts", in which he stressed that they should have a correct understanding of the treaty.
The President pointed out that they should hold fast to the independent stand in the Korean revolution, saying that the Soviet Union, faced with an unprecedented threat of invasion by Nazi Germany on its western frontier, concluded the treaty with the aim of preventing a possible pincer attack from the east by Japan and this didn't mean that the contradictions between the Soviet Union, the socialist state, and Japan, the imperialist state, were eliminated.
This was the clear analysis of the essence of the conclusion of a neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan.
In fact, the Japanese foreign minister's visit to Moscow to sign the neutrality pact with the Soviet Union was no more than a smokescreen.
The Japanese were always looking for a chance to push north, in other words, to attack the Soviet Union. Japan and Germany had agreed in secret to cooperate in an attack on the Soviet Union, and planned to divide the vast territory of the Soviet Union into two parts, with the Urals as the demarcation line to be occupied by each from the east and west, respectively.
However, Japan was not yet strong enough to invade the Soviet Union. So the southward policy got the upper hand. It was Japan's intention to occupy Southeast Asia, store up sufficient strategic reserves and then march into the Soviet Far East and swallow up the region as far as the line of the Urals only after Nazi Germany had inflicted fatal wounds on the Soviet Union. Japan's signing of the neutrality pact with the Soviet Union was a contortion in her timetable.
As German forces invaded the Soviet Union two months after the signing of the pact, Japan immediately ordered her Kwantung Army to stage "special exercises". During these exercises the strength of the Kwantung Army on the Soviet-Manchurian border doubled. This revealed what the Japanese really had in mind.
In such a situation as the large German forces massed on its western frontier might attack at any time, Japan's professed neutrality, in spite of her covetous eye on Siberia, gave the Soviet Union the respite of a possible delay in having to fight a two-front war. For this reason, the Soviet Union signed the neutrality pact with Japan to avoid a possible pincer attack from the east and west by Japan and Germany.
Since the President clarified the essence of the essence of the neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan and put forward the independent slogan, "Let us carry out the Korean revolution by our own efforts!", the temporary uneasiness and vacillation in the revolutionary ranks were thoroughly overcome and the KPRA soldiers and people could fight more vigorously with the conviction of sure victory.
Indeed, President
